Breaking away from the land policy stalemate

Theodore Levantis and Charles Yala
Australian Agency for International Development and
National Research Institute of Papua New Guinea/Crawford School of Economics and Government,
The Australian National University

Unlocking the potential of land is crucial for realising the development aspirations of the people of Papua New Guinea and the island nations of the Pacific, yet land policy development has largely been absent in these countries. Land is a political ‘hot potato’, which goes some way towards explaining this absence. In recent years, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu have pointed the way forward. Their focus has been on getting the land policy process right, because without this there can be no reform. It is as a result of problematic land policy processes that past reform efforts in the region have foundered.

The people of Papua New Guinea and the island nations of the Pacific aspire to prosperity. They aspire to their communities enjoying the standards of living taken for granted by the wealthy nations of the world. They aspire to living in peaceful communities, free of conflict. They aspire to reticulated water and sewerage systems, to electricity and communications, education for all, state-of-the-art health systems, quality housing and the full spectrum of other consumer choices.

Almost all people in Papua New Guinea and other Pacific societies have strong rights of access to land and are therefore well placed to pursue aspirations of broad and equitable prosperity. The challenge is to improve the way that land is used. Doing this will raise income opportunities and reduce community-level tensions and conflict. It will set the scene for the sustained economic growth a nation needs for prosperity, including the ability to bring education, health, community services and infrastructure to the people. Land policy reform is not the panacea for poverty, but it is a crucial piece in the development puzzle.

Papua New Guinea and the Pacific island countries do not have a good record of land policy reform. Reform of land policy has been described as a failed initiative in Papua New Guinea (Larmour 2003), in Melanesia (Larmour 2002) and across the broader Pacific region (Crocombe 2005). Most countries have been independent for one-quarter of a century or more and the opportunities lost during this time for building better land systems is lamentable. This is not to say that land policy reform has not been recognised as a crucial part of the development agenda. Governments have understood well the need to strengthen their land systems; and customary landowners are well aware of the need to adapt to take better advantage of the opportunities their land presents.
There are good reasons for the decades of land policy stalemate in the region. The reform task is enormous; it requires considerable funds and there are many competing development needs. Moreover, an all-inclusive process is especially difficult to plan and implement. Perhaps the main stumbling block for reform is, however, the fact that the importance of land exposes it as a potential political football. Elections can be won or lost over land—which would explain the aversion of politicians to become involved in land policy reform.

This paper focuses on the importance of the process of making land policy reform initiatives effective. A framework for defining a land policy reform process is outlined and used to analyse the initiatives under way in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. Although there are general principles in the wider literature, there seem to be no international best-practice models. This underpins the importance of countries designing a process that suits their own context with the aid of general principles—a point that is evident from the analysis of the Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu land policy reform initiatives. Although they are both Melanesian countries, their land reform initiatives are not the same.

Walking the path of process

Any aspirations for a well-functioning land system can be reached only if there is a functioning process; this is more important than anything else. Where past efforts at land policy reform in the region have foundered, it has been the result of a failure to meet this prerequisite. People can talk about what is needed to make land work; people can write about it in academic journals, books and the media; people can debate the solutions, but nothing will happen unless there is a functioning process. A process is crucial for getting things done. It does not matter if directions taken within a process are less than perfect, as long as consistent and continuous steps are taken on the path towards a well-functioning land system.

A process is needed because the magnitude of the task is huge. It is so big not only because of the scope of change needed in areas such as regulation, administration and the judiciary, but because any policy reform process requires the involvement of the entire community—as all people are stakeholders. It requires also the involvement of business, lenders, state-owned enterprises and government agencies.

Land policy reforms in Papua New Guinea and Pacific island countries cannot be developed and implemented in isolation within a government agency. They certainly cannot be developed and implemented from outside by donor agencies. The entire community and all affected entities must participate because all people have intrinsic social and economic connections with land, and customary authority prevails over most land. There can be no policy issue to compare with land for its scope and significance among the people. It is for these reasons that instituting a process that analyses divergent views, facilitates discussions and irons out differences—while maintaining commitment to the reform agenda—is essential.

The mechanics of a process

Three broad steps can be conceptualised as representing the components of a process for land policy reform: genesis, design and implementation (Kikeri et al. 2006). Each step is crucial to the success of the process. Previous efforts in the region have failed mostly in the genesis or design phases.
Genesis

The idea for a process and the motivation to pursue the idea must begin somewhere. It begins with the champions of reform. Such people might come from universities; they could be senior bureaucrats, community leaders or business representatives; or they could be politicians. Wherever they come from, champions have to build support to succeed. Ultimately, this means building political support. To do this, they need to establish their case among political leaders. They must also harness broader support among groups that are influential in politics, including community groups, business councils and the media.

A process for creating an effective land system can be seen as a 10 to 20-year exercise and, as such, requires long-term political commitment. To achieve this, consensus across politics—including from opposition parties—is imperative. Without political consensus, governments can expect a hostile and intense campaign to derail any process—and ultimately to oust the government. This means that success in getting land policy reform moving requires champions to campaign to the opposition benches as well as to the politicians in power. Land policy reform is not an issue that can survive divisive political agendas.

What is it that can trigger the emergence of champions of land policy reform, and the subsequent establishment of reform processes? One driving issue in the Pacific is that recent economic growth has been poor in comparison with developing countries elsewhere, including in Africa.

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Figure 1** Annual average growth rates in GDP per capita, selected regions, 1990–2005 (per cent)

**Sources:** Calculated and compiled from data in Australia, 2005. *Pacific 2020: challenges for opportunity and growth*, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Canberra:Table 2.2; and from data available on the web sites of UNSTATS, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
and the Caribbean (Figure 1). In many Pacific countries, income per capita has been stagnant or has declined. Most countries in the region are experiencing a festering economic crisis. People in the region aspire to prosperity but are becoming increasingly frustrated as economic opportunities fail to materialise. It is in these conditions that reforms with economic objectives are being crystallised all over the region and from which champions of land policy reform are emerging.

Design

Once the genesis phase gains momentum and political support for a land policy reform process is established, the next step is the design phase. A condition for the success of the design phase is to set up a workable institutional framework. The experience of land policy reform is that there are three broad categories for this.

Donor-led approach. Allowing donors to take the lead is a common approach to the design phase of land policy reform. Its acceptance is underpinned by two key advantages: 1) the design phase receives funding from the donor partners and, by forging donor partnerships, funding is likely to continue into the implementation phase; and 2) donors have strong access to technical expertise and international experience. A donor-led approach is, however, likely to undermine the harnessing of the breadth of support needed. To have a contentious issue such as land reform being led by foreign entities makes the mobilisation of opposition very easy. Moreover, a donor-led approach is likely to bring to the design team foreign biases about land issues and weaknesses in understanding local situations—factors that could lead to weak technical design.

Led by the land agency within the bureaucracy. This approach would seem to make a lot of sense as the established government land agencies have a deep knowledge of existing land systems, and land policy reform is within their mandate of responsibility. A distinct disadvantage is, however, the potential conflict of interest: the agency doing the design will be affected by the design. For example, if there is a situation of poor governance and corrupt practices, there will be resistance to change. In these circumstances, champions of change from within the land agencies are unlikely to emerge. This approach to the design phase can work only if there are senior bureaucrats within the land agencies who are champions of reform and who are receptive to a consultative process.

Led by an independent body established for the design phase. There are distinct advantages in having an independent design team—particularly if it is established with responsibilities only to cabinet. Its independence means that conflict-of-interest issues can be avoided. It also means that the team’s legitimacy in the consultation process will be enhanced. Much depends, however, on the composition of the team, its mandate, its terms of reference and how it frames and pursues the issues. Appointees would include those with strong expertise, with a diversity of representation—including people from commerce and community groups and key state institutions. Much also depends on government commitment to an appropriate level of funding.

Whatever the institutional structure of the design team, it is important that it begins with the conceptualisation of the structure of the reform agenda and its key elements. Ideally, it would ensure that the broad concepts and ideas of the land policy reform agenda passed three quality tests. First, they need to be sound theoretically and empirically. Second, they need to be suited to the country’s socio-cultural context. Third, they need to be understood, accepted and approved by the wider stakeholder constituency, including political leaders.
and landowners. Unless the basic ideas of the policy initiatives are theoretically and empirically sound, country-specific and accepted widely, there is no point pursuing the reform agenda.

A successful design phase for land policy reform can be thought of as having three broad elements

• the design of the policy reform recommendations
• the design of the institutional framework for implementation
• securing consensus for reform among politicians, stakeholders and the community at large.

The design of policy reform recommendations would first require the diagnosis of problems relating to land through research, inquiry, consultation and analysis. From there, remedies could be developed and priorities and sequencing for implementation analysed, taking account of funding and capacity constraints. In the design phase, recommended programs are often overly ambitious. When this happens, the process is set up to fail at the implementation stage. To determine a realistic pace for reform, the design team would need to gauge the available funding and the technical skills needed in the implementation phase. Where there are obvious weaknesses, the design team might include strategies for direct intervention to strengthen the areas of weakness. Moreover, to ensure the sustainability of the system its design needs to account for the continuing costs of operation and the mechanisms for financing these costs. This is crucial for the long-term sustainability of the individual components as well as the overall program.

A realistic approach for the design team would be to have a multi-decade view for achieving the land policy reforms, but to have short to medium-term planning horizons. It is crucial to design an institutional framework for the implementation phase that can do this. There needs to be a link between the key components and the implementing institutions, matched by the financial resource requirements. The absence of an appropriate framework for implementation will frustrate implementation. The core elements are the identification of the implementing agencies, their respective roles and the linkages between each component.

The success of land policy reform depends on the ability of the design team to win broad support at the political and community levels, and among key stakeholder groups. At the core of harnessing broad support is a comprehensive consultation process, including public forums. It must also include targeted meetings with stakeholders, including business groups, community representatives and senior bureaucrats. Opposing groups, including non-governmental organisations, could be consulted to reduce the risk of campaigns opposing change.

To be effective, consultations need to facilitate the two-way flow of information. Forums could be used as information sessions to outline the rationale for the land policy reform and the potential directions for change. This would help defuse any suspicions and fend off misinformation campaigns. The forums would also be about identifying problems, gathering ideas for moving forward and gauging views about the proposals. If, as a result of this two-way consultation process, the design team moves towards recommendations that are less than technically brilliant but have widespread acceptance and support, this is a much better outcome than to have a technically brilliant set of recommendations that goes nowhere.
Implementation

Land policy reform processes often fall over at the implementation phase. This occurs most commonly due to shortcomings in the design phase. The consultative process might have been lacking and broad support was not achieved; or perhaps the design was exposed as technically deficient or unworkable during the implementation phase. Even when the design phase is well executed, however, the implementation phase can stumble. Key factors could be the sustainability of political support, bureaucratic support and funding. Another key issue might be the lack—or poor design—of an appropriate institutional framework for implementation. If, for example, the implementation phase was to be led by the lands department and its officials were resistant to change, the implementation phase would not succeed.

For a successful implementation phase, there needs to be an oversight body reporting directly to cabinet (Kikeri et al. 2006). The oversight body could be a committee or an independent commission and could comprise key figures in the reform implementation process, including senior representatives from the lands and finance departments. It could also comprise key stakeholders—including community and business representatives—to ensure a transparent, balanced and well-informed process.

Throughout the implementation phase, it is imperative that the oversight body continues the dialogue with key stakeholders, including a continuing public awareness and consultation campaign to keep people up-to-date on developments and allow developments to be contested in the public arena. Failure to do this would risk a loss of support and the strengthening of any opposition. To ensure the continuation of the process in the event of political change, dialogue would need to include opposition politicians.

The oversight body would be responsible for delegating responsibilities for undertaking the tasks outlined in the design phase. It would also have responsibility for the monitoring and evaluation of progress in completing these tasks. An underlying function of the oversight body would be to establish and maintain the financing of the implementation phase. This part of the process could include engagement with the local department of finance and with potential donors. Donors might also be engaged to help procure technical expertise where there are local shortfalls.

Another role of the oversight body could be to screen new research findings for quality and relevance; this might require research to evaluate their validity. If the ideas are good, they could be incorporated into the reform agenda. This screening role would insulate implementing agencies from the influences of new and untested ideas and allow the new information to be processed and adopted adequately through the proper system of decision making. Pacific island country bureaucracies are particularly vulnerable to accepting weak policy ideas due to their small scale and limited analytical capacity. To be effective, the oversight body might have to be supported by a technical institution or team capable of undertaking research and analysis.

Experiences from Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu

Land policy reform has been a failed policy agenda in Papua New Guinea and in the Pacific. A new wave of land policy initiatives is, however, under way within the region, including in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Samoa. The South Pacific Forum Secretariat has launched an initiative aimed at raising land policy reform issues at the regional
level. Australia—the dominant bilateral donor within the region—has also initiated a program aimed at supporting Pacific governments interested in undertaking land policy reform.

With a view to pointing the way for policy reform in the Pacific, the conceptual framework in the preceding section is used to analyse initiatives—past and present—in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.

**Past experiences in Papua New Guinea**

There have been several land policy reform efforts in Papua New Guinea dating back more than half a century. These reform initiatives have failed or have fallen short of their objectives (Fingleton and ToLopa, forthcoming). Two of the more notable reform attempts were the World Bank-led program for customary land registration in 1995 and the reform process built around the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (CILM) in 1973 (Manning, forthcoming). The World Bank-led initiative was imposed on Papua New Guinea, as it was attached as a condition to a loan. For this reason, the genesis phase of the reform process did not begin with local champions of reform or the building of widespread ownership and support, including political support. Instead, the project moved straight to the design phase. As a result, the design phase was donor-led, presenting an immense challenge in winning local support. Indeed, little effort to win support was made and the program sank amid bitter opposition.

In contrast with the World Bank-led program, the land policy reform process begun in 1973 followed the key principles we outlined earlier for the genesis and design phases. From the outset, broad support was established and the CILM was set up and supported by the Chief Minister. There was an appropriate institutional framework for the design phase with an independent commission taking charge; and there was considerable consultation, including 141 public hearings. The reform process stumbled, however, at the implementation phase. While there were some initial achievements, the momentum from the implementation phase was not sustained. Measures were not taken to ensure long-term commitment to a continuing process; this can be explained largely by the failure to establish an appropriate institutional framework for implementation. As a result, there were no sustained funding mechanisms and no oversight bodies in charge of implementation, monitoring, evaluation and public consultation.

**The current land policy reform process in Papua New Guinea**

In the three decades after the CILM process there has been no progress on land policy reform. This has coincided with three decades of economic stagnation, rapid population growth and declining living standards. It is against this backdrop that champions of reform have emerged. Supported by the increasing availability of diagnostic research, the campaign for a new initiative on land policy reform gathered momentum and, in the middle of 2005, the Minister of Lands and Physical Planning convened a national land summit.

The task of organising the summit was given to a committee comprising representatives of government agencies, PNG-based universities and research organisations. The summit was given the theme ‘land, economic growth and development’. The broad aim of the summit was to outline the rationale for change and to discuss directions for moving forward. Doing this through a highly publicised national event proved a very successful genesis for the land policy process.

Expectations of change were built up as a result of the summit, providing the motivation for political and bureaucratic
powers to move to the next phase. A report was presented to the National Executive Council (Papua New Guinea’s cabinet) synthesising the discussions at the summit and, from this, the National Executive Council agreed to proceed to the design phase of a land policy reform process through the National Land Development Taskforce (NLDT 2007). While membership of the task force included the same institutions that formed the summit’s coordinating committee, the membership of its three committees—Land Administration, Land Dispute Settlement and Customary Land Development—included practitioners, non-government representatives, key government agencies, banking sector representatives and academia.

Having the design phase led by an independent body reporting to the National Executive Council was in accordance with the third category outlined earlier. The NLDT executed the design phase with considerable success. It culminated in a report, launched in February 2007, outlining the findings of its recommendations (NLDT 2007). The report was endorsed by the National Executive Council and its recommendations formed the basis for the launch of the implementation phase by the Prime Minister under the National Land Development Program.

Central to the success of the NLDT was its strategy of consultation and public information. While a team of experts was formed to develop the technical aspects of the reform, the consultation process involved exchanges of views, and the directions taken in the design phase were influenced by the views received. The NLDT disclosed its proceedings to the public in full, with full-page advertisements in the newspapers, and by keeping reporters well informed. Numerous public meetings were held throughout the country, and private meetings were held with key stakeholders, including non-governmental organisations. Broad political and bureaucratic support was courted to minimise risk in the event of a change of government. These strategies for building support and diffusing opposition were considered by the NLDT as fundamental to the success of the land policy reform process. According to the report, ‘[t]he NLDT has the firm view that, in dealing with a highly sensitive subject, wider consultations on all land matters require careful consideration, as much as possible to gain unambiguous support and acceptance by Papua New Guinea’s citizens’ (NLDT 2007).

It is notable that there was no foreign participation in the NLDT process. A core strategy of the task force was to restrict participation to Papua New Guineans and PNG institutions. Traditionally, land issues have been resolved through discussion, mediation and agreement at the community level by members of the community. The NLDT process drew on tradition and took this to the national level. Land issues were dealt with at the national level by PNG nationals.

**The institutional framework for the implementation phase**

There is no guarantee that the implementation phase will be successful, and it would be prudent to heed the lessons from the CILM process of the 1970s, particularly with regard to the building of a solid institutional framework for implementation. So far, the process of implementation has been positive, with the establishment of the National Land Development Program. The National Land Development Program comprises programs, sub-programs and projects within each sub-program. The Program is envisaged to be organic. To achieve this vision, four important components have been established. The Project Implementation Unit is the technical
body responsible for coordinating and driving the implementation of the program. Although the Project Implementation Unit is located within the Department of Lands and Physical Planning, the National Executive Council has agreed to outsource the unit, with a view to injecting energy from the private sector into the implementation process.

The next level of the structure is the Management Committee, which is made up of the secretaries of the key implementing agencies. This committee will provide oversight of the implementation process, with the Project Implementation Unit reporting to it on progress and challenges during the implementation stage. The Economic Ministerial Committee—which comprises the key economic portfolios in cabinet—is the third important component. This committee is expected to provide political leadership for the National Land Development Program.

Finally, an independent oversight body—the National Land Development Advisory Group (NLDAG)—will provide independent oversight to the implementation of the National Land Development Program by reviewing progress reports prepared by the Project Implementation Unit, undertaking independent research and screening new ideas and suggestions from other research and experiences. The NLDAG will have representation from universities, research institutions, non-governmental organisations and the private sector. The NLDAG’s independent assessments of the implementation process will be presented for consideration by the management and ministerial committees.

Substantial funding for the process has been provided by the Government of Papua New Guinea in the 2008 National Budget. A key task of producing a concept design document that packages and costs the implementation process for the first five years has been completed. The NDLP—designed to be a long-term program with an expected minimum limit of 20 years—has been divided into four five-year phases. At the end of each fourth year, the next phase in the implementation process will be packaged and its costs estimated.

It has taken one year for the genesis phase (2005), one year for the design phase (2006) and one year to establish the institutional framework for implementation (2007). Implementation is expected to begin in 2008, blocked into a five-year cycle. It is important that the National Land Development Program maintains a strategy of public awareness and consultation, and a process of monitoring and evaluating the tasks implemented. It will need strategies to build and maintain long-term commitment from all sides of politics. After four years, it would then be planning for the launch of a new phase of the land policy reform process.

**The Vanuatu experience**

In the years immediately after Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, a number of land policy reforms were implemented. These related to consolidating the sweeping changes at independence, when all alienated land reverted to customary ownership. In the next quarter of a century there was little land policy reform, but the land situation changed considerably, particularly as a result of the rapid growth in land development by foreign interests and the emergence of a lively real estate market. With little attention paid to policy, the development of rules and regulations appropriate for the evolving land market did not eventuate. Significant problems have emerged, not least of which has been the exploitation of landowners’ information asymmetry by wily investors and real estate agents. The result has been a build up of disenchantment and frustration among the people over land issues.
This mood laid the foundation for champions of reform to emerge. At the National Self-Reliance Summit held in 2005, champions of land policy reform pushed for a national land summit (Manning, forthcoming). These people emerged from community organisations and spread to the senior bureaucracy of the Lands Department. This was a crucial development, as political support was not strong in the genesis phase.

The Lands Department initiated a major information and consultation process in the lead-up to the national land summit. Newspapers, radio and television were used to great effect to publicise the summit process, and to generate discussion and debate. By the time of the summit, strong political and community support for the process had been established. The vision for the summit was for it to be a forum for the development of a plan on land policy issues and for there to be consensus in support of that plan across stakeholder groups and the broader community. In this sense it was to be the cornerstone of the design phase of the land policy reform process. The lead-up to the summit was the period in which broad community and political support was harnessed and so it might better be described as part of the genesis phase.

The national land summit was convened in September 2006 and it was a major national event. The proceedings were covered comprehensively by the media, including live broadcasts. The summit lasted for a week and included a series of presentations and submissions on which general discussion was based and resolutions agreed on. A core principle in the approach to consultation at the summit—and during the lead-up to it—was that views be exchanged. As a result, the resolutions were influenced greatly by the forum’s participants.

The summit produced more than 1,000 resolutions. A technical working committee was engaged to distil these into 20 recommendations built around three themes: land ownership; fair dealings in land; and sustainable development of land (Manning, forthcoming). These were considered by the Council of Ministers (Vanuatu’s cabinet) and, in the main, were endorsed in November 2006 as a policy for implementation. This policy included the important step of establishing a steering committee as an oversight body to guide the implementation process, and a commitment to funding. Importantly, the steering committee comprised a wide representation of stakeholders, providing a firm base for sustaining a credible process of public consultation and awareness.

The key risk in the implementation phase is that there is a polarisation of views on the issue of land for development within the steering committee and in the broader community (Manning, forthcoming). There are those who would like to see the current rapid rate of land development continue, while others would prefer a substantial reining in of land development and increased emphasis on traditional land uses. The design phase of the land policy reform process was successful in finding a middle ground, however, the polarisation of views means that this middle ground is unstable. Crucial to the continuing success of the implementation phase will be for the steering committee to maintain a public information and consultation process in support of a consensual approach. This is key to maintaining broad community and political support.

To date, progress in implementation has been made in a number of areas, but has stalled in others—particularly with regard to the key resolution of removing ministerial powers to sign leases on behalf of landowners when the ownership of the
land is in dispute. Donor support has been provided in the implementation phase, but importantly, this has so far occurred in a passive way with the steering committee taking the lead.

Conclusion

Until very recently, land policy reform has by and large been a failed policy agenda in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific. This stalemate can be explained by the absence of appropriate processes. With a view to making a contribution towards understanding how to reach a successful outcome in the Pacific region, this paper first defined a conceptual framework and then used it to analyse the reform processes under way in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu: processes that have demonstrated significant promise, particularly in Papua New Guinea.

The three core phases of the land reform process are genesis, design and implementation. Each is critical for eventual success. In applying this concept to the cases of Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, it is clear that there is no strict formula for proceeding through these phases, with significant differences between the countries in the genesis and design phases. Country context clearly matters. Both countries have progressed to the implementation phase.

In Papua New Guinea, the champions of reform came largely from research institutions and were led by the Minister of Lands and Physical Planning. In contrast, the key champions of reform in Vanuatu came from within the senior bureaucracy of the Lands Department as well as from community groups. Also, in Vanuatu—unlike Papua New Guinea—the momentum for land policy reform did not build from an issue of economic development. In Vanuatu, secure access to land is available for investors, so access to land does not represent an impediment to economic growth. Instead, the genesis for reform emerged against a backdrop of growing social and distributional issues relating to land.

While Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu convened national land summits as major national events, the nature of these summits and the manner in which they were incorporated into the broader land policy reform process were very different. In Papua New Guinea, the summit represented the genesis phase of the process. Its purpose was to generate discussion and interest in land policy reform and to motivate the beginning of a land policy reform process. In Vanuatu, the summit could be characterised better as the cornerstone of the consultation process within the design phase of the land policy reform process. For Vanuatu, it was the National Self-Reliance Summit that represented the key genesis point.

Whether Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu succeed or fail in the implementation stage remains to be seen. Of the three stages, implementation arguably poses the greatest challenges. The role of the oversight body, continuing public consultation and continued research, analysis and dissemination of information to all stakeholders are crucial to maintaining momentum. It is also crucial for there to be a strong and sustainable institutional framework for implementation. While individual champions of reform are important, far more significant is the need to have these individuals embedded in key institutions so that ownership and the history of the reform process are institutionalised. This recognises the reality that individuals are mobile and that if key people move, the land policy reform process—and hence the work of the institutions—must continue. Papua New Guinea has put in place a sophisticated and comprehensive institutional framework...
for implementation; Vanuatu less so. Again, however, country context matters and the workings of government and capacity constraints could preclude Vanuatu from putting in place something more comprehensive.

Finally, reforms are, by and large, very difficult. The process and principles described in this paper, although focused on land, clearly have applications beyond land.

References


Acknowledgments

The views in this paper are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organisations with which they are affiliated. The authors acknowledge helpful comments from Esekia Warvi, Executive Officer, National Land Development Program, Papua New Guinea.